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Perhaps the most controversial and heavily scrutinized issue of the twentieth century was President Harry Truman’s decision to unleash atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the summer of 1945. While the sequence of events preceding that fateful summer morning of August 6,1945 are fully understood, the motives behind Truman’s actions are shrouded in controversy. Top military officials publicly denounced the use of such a horrendous weapon, while the obvious advantages to the bomb, traditionalists argue, was a shortened Pacific War. Parallactic views between traditional beliefs and revisionist theories suggest that the issue is still very much unresolved. Why is the issue so hotly debated? Partially because of the overwhelming evidence supporting both sides, and partially from the unorthodox sources producing such evidence. But the question remains: Why did Truman drop the atomic bomb? Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb was not a military necessity because land invasion casualties were much lower than perceived, the Japanese were on the verge of collapsing, and America had avoided diplomacy despite knowing Japanese intentions.
Dropping the atomic bomb was necessary in preventing a land invasion where troops would encounter severe Japanese resistance. According to ancient Samurai tradition, the most honorable way of death was to sacrifice oneself for the emperor. Certainly, this philosophy became extensively practiced throughout the war, as evident with the notorious kamikaze missions. Soldiers would either die in combat, or commit suicide in order to prevent capture. During the battle of Okinawa, of the 117,000 Japanese soldiers stationed on the island, only 7,000 were left alive. On April 6-7 alone, 355 planes participated in kamikaze missions. In more extreme forms, dying honorably would consist of, “the training of young children to be ‘Sherman carpets.’ Japanese children were to be strapped with TNT and throw themselves under American tanks thereby dying in the most honorable way possible- by killing the enemy.” By using such radical forms of resistance, it is therefore highly conceivable that the number of Japanese killed would greatly outnumber the American total if fighting had been prolonged. In addition: “The Japanese army was already training its civilians to fight with sharpened bamboo poles…[By] using sharpened pikes the Japanese could easily prevent a military government from being effective in those towns which the U.S. captured.” The real predicament involving the invasion of Japan was the fierce resistance expected during and after the assault. Because of such drastic Japanese resistance, it would not only be impractical, it would be senseless to launch an attempt to invade and occupy Japan. Thus, dropping the atomic bomb was a military necessity in order to prevent a disastrous and precarious land invasion.
By avoiding a highly questionable land invasion, the bomb saved “half a million” American lives. In his personal diary, Truman wrote, “General Marshall told me that it might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy’s surrender on his home grounds.” This estimate was based on previous battle figures at Okinawa, where Americans suffered 50,000 casualties despite outnumbering the Japanese by two and a half to one. Indeed, if Truman opted to invade Japan, the total number of American and Japanese casualties would possibly be in the millions. Although the bomb took150,000 Japanese lives, the number of casualties would have been far greater had an invasion been executed. In 1985, in a special broadcasting the fortieth anniversary of the bombings, ABC’s Ted Koppel claimed: “What happened over Japan…was a human tragedy…But what was planned to take place in the war between Japan and the United States would almost certainly have been an even greater tragedy.” When compared to a land invasion, the atomic bomb certainly saved far more Japanese lives than would a land invasion. In addition, if “half a million” American lives were saved, then:
Perhaps fifty million Americans- the fathers and mothers and wives and children and brothers and sisters of the men and women in uniform-“knew,” too, that a loved one had been saved from possible death. If aunt uncles, cousins, grandparents, and close friends were included, virtually every individual in American society knew someone personally whose life, it appeared, had been saved or might possibly have been saved by the extraordinary new weapon.

The decision was well received among Americans, many of whom may possibly have been deployed on the mission. The decision did more than save half a million American lives; it also prevented the entire country from mourning the needless death of thousands of youth. Thus, the atomic bomb eliminated the possibility of needlessly jeopardize millions of American lives, and thus, its use was entirely justified.
The perception that Americans would face a disastrous invasion followed by radical resistance is greatly unfounded. While it is true that American casualties were high in Okinawa, the main difference between Kyushu and Okinawa was, “there had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room to maneuver.” In addition, the invasion of Tokyo would involve lighter losses since its many beaches would be more suitable for amphibious assault. Americans would certainly have experienced far greater success had a land invasion been executed. In fact, Truman was assured that there was “reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price…paid for Luzon [31,000 casualties]” Operation Olympic, the code name for a Japanese invasion, would have been much more efficient and experience less casualties, proportionally, compared to previous operations. Thus, a land invasion would certainly have not been as disastrous as is so often perceived.
The Japanese were willing to fight to the death provided the Emperor was in serious jeopardy, but the belief that they were never willing to surrender is exceedingly ignorant. It must first be understood that the Emperor in Japanese society is viewed as a descendent of God. Betraying or dishonor towards the Emperor, Tenno Heika-Son of God, therefore meant betrayal of God. Thus, when the United States announced that Japan must accept “unconditional surrender,” the Japanese felt the terms were a direct threat to the Emperor. The simple fact was that if America guaranteed the preservation of the imperial system, the Japanese would have offered far less resistance. General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Command prepared a study stating:
To dethrone, or hang, the Emperor would cause a tremendous and violent reaction from the Japanese. Hanging of the Emperor to them would be comparable to the crucifixion of Christ to us. All would fight to die like ants. The position of the gangster militarists would be strengthened immeasurably. The war would be unduly prolonged; our losses heavier than otherwise necessary.

The Japanese were fighting for the very existence of their God, and thus, were willing to sacrifice everything to defend him. As it became increasingly apparent that the Japanese were on the verge of collapse, the number of kamikaze missions (battle of Okinawa) sharply increased because they felt the Emperor was at a high risk.
The JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] stressed that without the Emperor’s support it would be difficult to bring about a meaningful surrender; it predicted that if peace terms were not backed up by “Imperial Sanction,” many major units of the Japanese armed forces deployed outside of Japan proper would continue to offer resistance in varying degrees.

Obviously, if the Japanese realized their Emperor was in serious danger, they would offer much fiercer resistance. The Americans realized that the safety of the Emperor was the only means of bringing about peace, yet they continued their stance on “unconditional surrender.” Thus, the belief that the Japanese were willing to fight to the death is preposterous, they were willing to surrender as long as the Emperor was spared.
The figure of “half a million” American lives was conduced by Truman in an attempt to justify his actions. In June of 1945, Truman ordered the military to calculate the number of casualties of a planned assault on Japan. In response, the Joint War Plans Committee concluded that a plan to invade Japan through Kyushu would likely cause 40,000 deaths, 150,000 wounded, and 3,500 missing. These numbers were later read by Truman himself, and he concluded, “the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.” He then told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the plan was “all right from a military standpoint.” Thus, the original casualty figure was 40,000, not “half a million” as is often perceived. Truman himself eventually magnified the numbers for reasons unknown. On April 6, 1949, the president stated that he “made that decision because I thought 200,000 of our young men would be saved by making that decision, and some 3[00,000] or 400,000 of the enemy would be saved by making that decision.” However, in a letter sent to Professor James L. Cate in January of 1953, Truman claims:
I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on Tokio…plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other naval men present agreed.

And finally, on April 28, 1959, in front of students at Columbia University, Truman stated that “the dropping of the bombs stopped the war, saved millions of lives.” Why are there such discrepancies in Truman’s figures? Truman exaggerates the figures in order to provide self-defense, which is highly practiced in government. As opposition to the atomic bomb augments, Truman increases the figure in order to defend and justify his decision. Thus, although the original calculation of casualties submitted by the Joint War Plans Committee was 193,000 killed, wounded or missing, Truman later embellishes this figure in order to justify his decision.
The effective American blockade was sufficient to bring about Japanese collapse in less than half a year after the atomic bombings. Widespread belief among top American officials was that the surrender of Japan was inevitable-even without the atomic bomb. Before the summer of 1945, it had become increasingly apparent that the Japanese were on the verge of destruction. As the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chief of Staff put it:
Due to the shortage of ocean shipping, Japan’s main rail lines are already overburdened, while motor transportation is totally inadequate…Under these circumstances the Japanese “will” to continue war may be expected to weaken progressively. Entirely apart from the physical results obtained by air-sea blockade combined with strategic bombing, the psychological effects upon the Japanese people as a whole will be most detrimental and will progressively undermine their confidence in victory or even confidence in the hope of avoiding complete and inevitable defeat.

American bombing strategies were highly successful and had already brought Japan to a state of despair. The bulk of Japan’s military was stationed around Southeast Asia, and the blockade was effectively preventing supplies and reinforcements from leaving the home islands. If dropping the bomb was a military necessity, did Japan’s worsening condition actually pose such an immediate threat to American safety to allow such drastic weapons be used? The fact that Japan had already been effectively isolated causes increased suspicion as to why the bomb was dubbed a necessity. Japan’s disastrous state is described by General George C. Kennedy:
The situation is developing rapidly and there are trends which indicate that the Jap is not going to last much longer. His sea power is so badly depleted that it is no match for any one of the several task forces we could put into action. His air power is in a bad way. He has a lot of airplanes-probably more than he had a year ago- but he has lost his element, flight, squadron and group leaders and his hastily trained replacements haven’t the skill or ability or combat knowledge to compete with us . . . Without the support of his sea power and air power his land forces cannot do anything except hold out in isolated, beleaguered spots all over the map until bombs, bullets, disease and starvation kill them off.

It is safe to assume that the Japanese were slowly on the decline. But how long would the Japanese hold out before finally surrendering had the bomb not been used? After all, the use of the bomb was mainly to bring about a speedy end to the Pacific War. It was a year after the bombing when “the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey published its conclusion that Japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing…and without an American invasion.” If Japan was on the verge of surrendering within the next half year, it would suggest that there was no necessity to drop the atomic bomb, certainly not to the degree that many claim. The Japanese were in such terrible condition however, that the same conclusion could easily have been made a year earlier. Therefore, because of Japan’s terrible state, atomic bombs were never needed to bring about an inevitable Japanese surrender.
American officials were well aware of Japanese intentions of surrendering, yet they refused to use diplomatic efforts. By late 1944, as the Japanese watched Germany’s power diminish, peace feelers began to make offers with the Allied Powers. As early as September 26, 1944:
I learn from a very reliable source that in important civilian circles in Japan the peace problem is being discussed with increasing anxiety. A speedy German collapse is expected and it is not believed that Japan can then continue the war. It is therefore considered necessary to get peace as soon as possible before the country and towns are destroyed…If any willingness appeared to exist in London the Japanese would be ready for preliminary discussions through Swedish channels…there is no doubt that this attempt be considered a serious one.
On July 13, Foreign Minister Togo instructed his ambassador in Moscow to inform the Russians, whom the Japanese had a neutrality pact, that:
His majesty the emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated . . . It is the Emperor’s private intention to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a Special Envoy with a letter from him containing the statements given above.

In addition, the Emperor had advised his top officials: “We have heard enough of this determination of yours to fight to the last soldiers. We wish that you, leaders of Japan, will now strive to study the ways and means to conclude the war. In so doing, try not to be bound by the decisions you have made in the past.” If Japan had offered peace terms, and were willing to negotiate, why was it necessary to drop the atomic bomb in order to bring about peace? Had Truman opted for peaceful negotiations, he may have received the same ends (saving American lives) without ever killing thousands of innocent Japanese civilians. For reasons unknown, Truman decided to defer from peace talks-a much more effective and moral way of ending the conflict. Since the Japanese were readily willing to negotiate peace, the dropping of the bombs was certainly not a military necessity.
In conclusion, due to exaggerated casualty figures, an inevitable Japanese collapse, and an avoidance of peace negotiations, dropping the atomic bomb was not a military necessity. The argument that the atomic bomb saved countless American lives is weak, as a diplomatic route would accomplish the same means without every having to sacrifice a single life. Moreover, it has been proven that the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse, and American interference simply hastened an inevitable surrender a few months later. When juxtaposed with other options, the use of the atomic bomb seems to be the most destructive as well as unreasonable. Truman’s true motives for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki may never be fully understood, but the myth that he has partially created will continue. He has in essence, created an American myth, one that is supported by a sense of subconscious guilt. As opposition to Truman’s actions strengthen, people will no longer ask, “How many American lives were saved because of the atomic bomb?” Instead, they will ponder, “How many Japanese lives were needlessly killed?” For the time being, the average American cannot respond to the latter, only the former. Thus, Truman’s atomic myth persists.

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